Legal Methods as a Point of Reference for Comparative Studies of Procedural Law
Comparative study of procedural law is a relatively new phenomenon.Whileformorethanacenturycomparativistshave mettoaddressissuesoflawcomparatively,theirfocuslongwas onrulesofsubstantivelawratherthanonprocedurallaw.Insofar as they gave procedure attention, they did so largely in the contextofmoreglobalcomparisonsoflegalsystemsassuch.
Butnowcomparativists,withlawreforminmind,aregivinggreaterattentiondirectlytocomparativeprocedure.Thedifficultiestheireffortsencounterdemonstratewhysucheffortshave beenlateincoming.Itishardertoexamineprocedurallawcomparativelythansubstantivelaw.Procedurallawislesssusceptible to traditional tools of comparative analysis than is substantive law. Isolating elements of procedural law is more difficult, while changing elements can be more politically controversial. Procedure is a system. As a system, each element is interrelated; one cannot satisfactorily examine any single element in isolation withouttakingintoaccountotherelements. 1 Tobesure,rulesofsubstantivelawarealsopartsofasystem. Comparativistsaddressthisproblem,amongotherways,by what is known as a functionalist approach. 2 A functionalist comparison focuses not on rules, but on functions rules serve. Functionalismthusseekstoassurethatwecomparelikewithlike.ProfessorDavidGerberrecentlycalledforapplyingfunctionalismto comparativestudyofprocedurallawandofferedupaframework for such studies. 3 Meanwhile Professors Peter Murray and Rolf Stürner published their treatise on German civil justice in which theyincludeacomparisonoffunctionsofAmericanandGerman civil procedure. 4 Professor Oscar Chase, on the other hand, cautions us about the difficulties of comparative studies of procedurallaw." [C] ourtprocedures,"hecomments,"reflectthefundamental values, sensibilities and beliefs (the "culture") of the collectivitythatemploysthem." 5 Forconveniencesake,Irefertohis pointofviewasculturalism.
In some respects functionalism and culturalism are two sides of the same coin: functionalism emphasizes similarities among systems of procedure, while culturalism emphasizes differences. More broadly this contrast reflects a long-standing difference of opinion among jurists between those who see law as principally a technical tool for organizing society and those who seeitasanhistoricaldevelopmentofthepeoples'consciousness. Inthe19 th century,thatdifferencetooktheformofdebatesover codification. In the 21 st century, it is taking the form of debates overpossibilitiesfortransplantingandharmonizinglaw.
TodayIdonotwishtodebatethemeritsanddemeritsof either functionalism or culturalism. My talk has a more modest goal: to show that comparative study of procedural law would benefit from closer examination of legal methods. It is my-not verystartling-contentionthatalegalsystem'slegalmethodsre-vealmuchaboutthepurposesandgoalsofitsprocedureandthe relationship of procedure to culture. In this belief I follow Max Rheinstein,whowrote:
The essential difference between common law and civil law lies in the technical structure of courtprocedure,inthedifferentconceptualframeworkwithinwhichlegalthoughtmoves,andinthe underlyingcauseofthesedifferences:thediversity ofthepersonnelbywhichthemachineryoftheadministrationofjusticeishandledandguided. 6 A brief sketch of German legal methods suffices to establishGermandevotiontonorms.Germanlawmakingiscarefuland precise. We think first, of course, of the German Civil Code: the preeminent exemplar of German statutory law. While Germans complainthattoday'sstatutesandcoderevisionsfallshortofthe standards of their beloved BGB, German statutes are models of clarity and consistency with other statutes, at least as compared to their American counterparts. German statutes are subject to significantqualitycontrolsthatarenotpresentintheU.S.system. German laws originate largely within responsible ministries of government. They are drafted by professionals. They are vetted byministriesofjusticeresponsibleforproofingthemforconsistency with constitution and legal order. They are approved by 8 See1WOLFGANGFIKENTSCHER,DIEMETHODENDESRECHTSINVERGLEICHENDERDAR- STELLUNG13-15(1975 STELLUNG13-15( -1977 governmentcabinetsandthenbylegislatureswithaminimumof tinkering. It's not just codification that makes a difference between American and German law: it's that greater attention is given to drafting norms that are clear and consistent with other norms,easilyfoundandreadilyapplied.
German statutes usually are designed well to be applied easily.Well-ordered,Germannormsareeasilyfound.Responsibilityfortheirfindingrestsinthehandsofthelawappliers.Iurano vit curia-the court knows the law-is the German maxim; itt is unknowninAmericanlaw.
Judgesnotonlyfindlaw,theyapplyit.Judgescoaxparties toagreeonelementsofnormstoavoidtakingevidence.Theydeterminewhethertheelementsofthenormarefulfilled.Theyare responsible for writing judgments that demonstrate that norms areorarenotfulfilled.Germanjudgment-writingtechniquedemonstrates German devotion to norms: it validates norm application.ReinhardZimmermannwrites:"AGermanjudgmentissupposed to appear as an act of an impartial as well as impersonal public authority furnishing the official and objective interpretationratherthanbeingbasedonthepersonalopinionsofthedeciding justices. … The typical German judgment, like its French counterpart,strivesaftertheidealofdeductivereasoning." 13 Compared to the German system, the contemporary Americanlegalsystemshowsnormsrelativeindifference.Professor Stephen Subrin observes that in American procedure "the highest goal is for courts not to apply law to facts." 14 American lawmakingisoftenhapless,disorganizedorworse.Americanlawfindingisanythingotherthansimpleandefficient:itisacacophonyofcompetingandfrequentlyinconsistentstatutesandprecedents.Americanlaw-applyingfrequentlyisunpredictableandunaccountable:juriesdecidewithoutgivingreasonsandsometimes contrarytolaw. SmallwonderitisthatintheUnitedStatestheroleofrules in procedure has been questioned and alternative models proposed.Agenerationago,ProfessorLonFullerasked,whichcomes Our colleagues already see significant agreement among "modern" procedural systems. Professor Chase points out such systems share "reliance on formal rules of law as applicable norms and reliance on sensory evidence as a source of fact." 19 ProfessorsMurrayandStürnerobservethatGermanandAmeri-can systems of civil procedure both seek "the fair, accurate and efficient vindication of private rights and interests based on the existinglegal,politicalandsocialorder" 20 ProfessorGerberwould probablyagreewithallofthem.
Yetawarenessoflegalmethodssuggestssignificantdifferencesamongourcolleagues.ForProfessorsMurrayandStürner, the "primary purpose" of civil justice is "vindication of private rights." 21 ForProfessorGerber,ontheotherhand,procedureis"a setofinterrelatedfunctionsdesignedtofosterthepublicpurpose of resolving private disputes." 22 The difference is not merely semantic.
The while emphasis on process emphasizes the concrete relations of two parties. The former looks more to implementation of a particular order, while the latter is more concerned with dispute resolution.
2. My second general question is how we might best talk about the different types of functions that we are examining. AlthoughProfessorGerber,ontheonehand,andProfessorsMurray andStürner,ontheotherhand,allspeakintermsoffunction,they haveinminddifferenttypesoffunctions.Imightcharacterizethe functionsthatMurrayandStürnerconsiderasexternalfunctions ofprocedurallaw,whilethefunctionsthatProfessorGerberconsidersareinternal.ProfessorsMurrayandStürnerareconcerned with those functions that procedural law fulfills within the legal system as a whole. They discuss the different goals procedural law is designed to achieve. Professor Gerber, on other hand, assumes a single, primary external purpose. He then identifies "components"thatcontributetoattainingthatgoal.
While both approaches offer insights into comparative procedure,Ithinkthatweneedtobeclearastowhichwearetakingatanyonetime.Ibelievethatcomparativelegalmethodscan contributetobetterachievingboth.Iwouldliketosketchbriefly waysIthinkthattheycandothatlookingbothatexternalandinternal functions. The theme common to both is that, whether functions examined are internal or external, their presence and theirrelativeimportancevaryfromsystem-to-system.Thus,what worksinonesystemmaynotworkinanother,ormayhaveunintendedconsequences.Orwhatisusedinonesystemmaybevaluedforservingafunctionthatisnotasimportantinanadopting system. B. ExternalFunctions ProfessorsMurrayandStürnermaketheirdeparturepoint the31principlesoftheRulesofTransnationalProcedure.These they distil down to five "functions" for comparing between the German and the American systems of civil justice. They are: "1. Maintaining independence and credibility of the judicial institution;2.Providinglitigantswithhighqualitydeterminationsoffact andlaw;3.Guaranteeinglitigantsproceduralandsystematicfairness;4.Producingfinalenforceabledecisionswithoutunduede-layandatreasonablecost; [and] 5.Affordinglitigantsreasonably freeaccesstojustice." 23 Inaddition,theyaddtwooftheirown:"6. Contributingpositivelytothedevelopmentandexplicationofthe law; [and] 7. Generating among litigants and the overall population confidence and satisfaction in civil justice and the rule of law." 24 Theyidentifytwootherfunctionsdescribedaspeculiarto the American system: "public regulation of economic and social actors"and"publiceducation." 25 Theirlistoffunctionsissimilar tothatofProfessorSubrin'snon-exhaustivelistoften"valuesor goals American procedure serves. 26 Comparative legal methods tell us a lot about these functions, their evaluation and their respectiveweightings.
Four of the functions identified by Professors Muray and Stürner are litigant-focused: "2. Providing litigants with high quality determinations of fact and law; 3. Guaranteeing litigants proceduralandsystematicfairness;4.Producingfinalenforceable decisions without undue delay and at reasonable cost; [and] 5. Affording litigants reasonably free access to justice." How well thesefunctionsmaybefulfilledisdependentonhowwelltherespective legal methods are able to achieve them. Norm-oriented methodsmaybebettersuitedforcarryingoutsomeofthesefunctionswhereasprocess-orientedmethodsmaybebetteratothers.
The other three functions of Professors Murray and Stürner are legal-system-focused: 1. Maintaining independence and credibility of the judicial institution; 6. Contributing positivelytothedevelopmentandexplicationofthelaw; [and] 7.Generatingamonglitigantsandtheoverallpopulationconfidenceand satisfaction in civil justice and the rule of law." Again, the influenceofchoiceoflegalmethodsnecessarilyaffectstheevaluation andweightingofthesethreefunctions.Mostobvious,perhaps,is "6.Contributingpositivelytothedevelopmentandexplicationof 23 MURRAY&STÜRNER,supranote4,at574. 24 ID.
25 ID.at575-81. 26 Subrin,supranote12,at140("(1)resolvingandendingdisputespeacefully;
(2) efficiency; (3) fulfilling societal norms through law-application; (4) accurateascertainmentoffacts;(5)predictability;(6)enhancinghumandignity;(7) addinglegitimacyandstabilitytogovernmentandsociety;(8)permittingcitizenstopartakeingovernance;(9)aidingthegrowthandimprovementoflaw; (10)restrainingorenhancingpower.")the law." Where legislative norms are the basis of decision, the importance of norm-development in procedure should be less than where legislative norms are less important. Similarly the choice of legal methods may determine how to promote independence and credibility of the judiciary and how to generate overallpopulationconfidenceandsatisfactioninciviljusticeand the rule of law. What those mean will largely be measured by whetherthepopulation'sconceptionsaremorenorm-orprocessoriented.
C. InternalFunctions
Professor Gerber is concerned with procedural law as "a setofinterrelatedfunctionsdesignedtofosterthepublicpurpose ofresolvingprivatedisputes." 27 Hetakesthisastheprimarypurpose of procedural law and then identifies its components: a) commencinglitigation;b)acquiringdata;c)shapingthefacts;d) establishingthefacts;e)lawknowing:thebackgroundknowledge set;f)structuringlawforthecase;g)lawdetermination:deciding onlawforthecase;h)decidingontheoutcome:fact-lawinteraction;andi)terminationissues:appealsetc.
Here too, studies of comparative legal methods have an important contribution to make. Understanding of comparative legal methods suggests that in the German norm-based system, thepreeminentgoalisajudgmentstatinglegaltruth,whileinthe Americanprocess-basedsystem,thepreeminentgoalistheiconic "day-in-court." The German system is focused on establishing whetheranormisorisnotfulfilledbyfoundfacts.Thecontemporary American system is more concerned with providing partiesopportunitiestodiscoverfactsandarguelaw.Germanjudges areontheoutlooktofillouttheelementsofnorms,whileAmericanjudgesareconcernedwithrefereeingacontestbetweenparties.Thesearenotnewrevelations,buttheyaremadestarklyapparentthroughstudyofcomparativelegalmethods.
III. LegalMethodsandCulturalism
27 Gerber,supranote3,at666.
Maxeiner: LegalMethodsandComparativeProcedure, page11 Culturalism asserts that culture determines the forms of the legal system. In a stronger version espoused by Professor Chase,generalcultureitself-andnotjustaspecificallylegalculture-is determinative. How can study of legal methods help us addresstheissuesofculturalism? AtfirstblushmybriefcomparativesketchofGermanand Americanlegalmethodstendstoconfirmthehistoricstereotype of Germans as rule-oriented and Americans as free individuals less-constrainedbyrules.DidInot,afterall,justassertthatGerman methods are norm-oriented while American methods are not? This would seem to support Professor Chase's thesis that generalculturedeterminesprocedure.
Oncloserexamination,Iamnotsosure.Ihaveacausation issue.Whyshouldweassumethatculturedeterminesorevenreflects procedure. Might not procedure be determined by unrelated factors? Is present-day American civil procedure a product ofourcultureoraproductofsomethingelse-sayAmericanlegal methods?Therightanswermaybethatitisabitofboth.
Professor Chase identifies four features of American procedure that he considers responsible for "American procedural exceptionalism."Theseare:"(i)theciviljury;(ii)theuseofpartycontrolled pre-trial investigation; (iii) the relatively passive role ofthejudgeatthetrialorhearing;and(iv)themethodofobtainingandusingexpertopinionsontechnicalmatters." 28 Thesefourfeaturesarenotstatic.Theyhavechangedsubstantially over the past 160 years. I do not plan to venture here evenaguesswhetherinthistimeperiodtherehasbeenacorrespondingchangeinAmericanculturethatmightaccountforthese changes.Iwillventure,however,thattherehavebeenchangesin legal methods that could account for some of those changes in procedureandwhichcouldaccountforexceptionalism.
Inthelast160yearsAmericanlegalmethodshavebecome progressively less norm-oriented even as American society has introducedmanymorenorms.WhileAmericansliveinanageof statutes, their legal methods are less-oriented toward applying normsnowthanbefore.Ithinkthereisacasetobemadethatthe formsofAmericanexceptionalismthatProfessorChaseidentifies followed, rather than preceded, a failure of more norm-oriented legal methods. American exceptionalism might be seen less as a productofparticularculturalvalues,andmoreasamundanefailureofpoliticalandlegalsystemstodevelopeffectivelegalmethods. Let's look at the first two examples that Professor Chase gives:theciviljuryanddiscovery. 29 ThecontemporaryAmericanjuryisconsiderablydifferent fromthejuryof160yearsago.Thejuryofthatdaywas,thanksto special pleading, restricted to deciding a single factual point in issue. Legal historians are still researching the extent to which those controls were effective. Nevertheless, the legal system clearly anticipated close control over the law-finding and lawapplyingroleofthejury.Thespecialpleadingofthecommonlaw kepttheciviljuryonashortleash.Party-directeddiscoverywas practically unknown. As late as when my father graduated from law school in 1936, it still was exceptional. It started to become thenormonlywiththeadoptionoftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurein1938.
Iwouldliketosuggestthatthemodern-dayciviljuryand freediscoveryareproductsoffailuresoflegalmethodsinthe19 th century.Inthemiddleofcenturylawreformerschallengedcommonlawpleading.Commonlawpleadingwasverynormoriented. Itcalledforsyllogisticapplicationoflawandallowedjuriesonlya narrow role in law application. Discovery was unknown.The reformers who challenged common law pleading were not, however, adverse to legal norms. In fact, they believed in them. The same reformers who sought abolition of special pleading, also sought codification of substantive law. But while they succeeded in abolishing special pleading and replacing it with "code pleading,"theywerenotsuccessfulincodifyingsubstantivelaw. They didnotreplaceitwithalimitednumberofrationalizedcausesof action.Theirattemptsatcodificationfailedrepeatedlyinthe19 th century. Did the triumphs of anti-code forces reflect American cultureorthepoliticalcloutoftheprofessionalbar?Acasecanbe made for the latter. The New York legislature passed codes only to see the governor veto them. Similar attempts to rationalize substantivelawfailedattheturnofthecenturyintheformofthe UniformLawmovementandfailedagaininthe20 th centuryinthe form of restatements. The story is a complicated one and there arenoeasyanswers.Mypointis,however,thatculture'srole,ifit hasone,mightbetterbeseeninthedefeatofalternativesthanin a positive selection of today's institutions. The legal methods themselves may be responsible for today's procedural institutions.
IV. Closing TodayIhaveonlybeenabletosuggestthevalueofstudy oflegalmethodsforcomparative.Ihopeinthefuturetobeableto address these issues in greater detail. Thank you for your attention.
